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I. Carbon Credits in Brazil*
On July 21, 2009, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissdo de
Valores Mobilidrios, or the CVM) informed the market' that Certified Emission Reduc-
tions, or CERs (also more commonly known as carbon credits) are not derivatives or
assets to which investment funds are linked (titulos de investimento coletivo), and conse-
quently shall not be treated as securities (valores mobilidios) or regulated as such by the
CVM. The position of the Brazilian regulator with respect to CERs is that such instru-
ments are deemed to be assets whose sale can occur for investment purposes or to meet
emission-reduction goals. Therefore, CERs currently are not subject to the requirements
of Law No. 6.385, of December 7, 1976, as amended by Law No. 10.303, of October 31,
2001 (the Brazilian Securities Law, or BSL),2 which governs the Brazilian securities
market.
For the purposes of the BSL, the term securities3 comprises the following: (i) shares,
debentures, and subscription bonuses; (ii) coupons, rights, subscription receipts, and split
certificates relating to the securities indicated in item (i); (iii) certificates of deposit of
securities; (iv) debentures certificates; (v) shares of mutual funds investing in securities and
shares of investment clubs investing in any type of assets; (vi) commercial paper; (vii) fu-
tures, options, and other derivatives agreements whose underlying assets are securities;
(viii) other derivatives agreements regardless of the respective underlying asset class; and
(ix) when publicly offered, any other collective investment instrument or agreement that
creates the right of participation in profits or remuneration, including as a result of the
* Gary Silber served as the editor for the International Products and Services Committee. He is an
attorney at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in Washington D.C. Bios for other contributing editors
appear by their portions of the article.
* Section I "Carbon Credits in Brazil" was contributed by Walter Stuber and Adriana Maria G6del
Stuber, attorneys at Walter Stuber Consultoria Juridica in SIo Paulo, Brazil.
1. Press Release, CVM, CVM Communicate Their Understanding of Carbon Credits (July 21, 2009),
availabk at http://www.cvm.gov.br.
2. Lei No. 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, D.O.U. de 09.12.1976. (Brazil), available at http://www.plan
alto.gov.br.
3. Lei No. 10.303 de 31 de outubro de 2001, art. 2.
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rendering of services, and whose profits derive from the efforts of the entrepreneur or
from the efforts of third parties. All securities are subject to the supervision of and control
by the CVM. Federal, state, or municipal government bonds and negotiable instruments
guaranteed by a financial institution (other than debentures) are not deemed to be securi-
ties for this purpose 4 and are subject to the supervision and control of the Central Bank of
Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil, or Bacen) and not of the CVM.
CERs are instruments issued by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive
Board, a body created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. This body supervises the CDM or an instrument that represents the voluntary
reduction of emissions of a certain quantity of greenhouse gases (GHGs). One CER is
equal to one ton of carbon. CDMs are based on the principle that companies based in
emerging markets can voluntary reduce their emission of GHGs, or alternatively increase
the sequestration of GHGs, through the trading of carbon credits in a global carbon mar-
ketplace. Transactions can occur with industrialized countries (or with companies in such
countries) in need of credits to meet their emission reduction targets in accordance with
the Kyoto Protocol. This flexible mechanism, therefore, enables countries to reduce their
global GHG emissions while also providing an attractive alternative method to foster sus-
tainable development in emerging market countries. The CDM is the only such mecha-
nism available in Brazil.
Some carbon credit products related to CERs, such as certificates, synthetic instru-
ments, or derivatives, depending on their specific characteristics, might be considered se-
curities by the CVM. Each such product needs to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. If
the CVM considers such a product a security, it will be subject to the BSL.
Brazilian investment funds are duly authorized to acquire CERs or other carbon credit
certificates or derivatives in accordance with rules and regulations that govern these
funds.5 Among authorized financial assets, investment funds can invest in numerous prod-
ucts such as warrants, contracts for the forward purchase or delivery of credits, or any
other relevant transaction or product, provided the transaction or product is expressly
authorized by regulations applicable to such funds.6
CERs are considered to be financial assets issued outside Brazil and their acquisition by
investment funds is determined by the rules and regulations applicable to such funds.
Furthermore, CERs acquired by or entered into by a fund must be listed on a relevant
stock, commodities, or futures exchange, or must otherwise be registered in their home
4. Lei No. 10.303 de 31 de outubro de 2001, art. 2, § 1.
5. The current regulations on the incorporation, administration, operation, and disclosure of information
with respect to Brazilian investment funds have been approved by Instrucao CVM No. 409, de 18 de Agosto
de 2004, D.O.U. de 24.08.2004. (Braz.) (amended by: (i) Instrucao CVM No. 411, de 26 de Novembro de
2004, D.O.U. de 01.12.2004. (Braz.); (ii) Instrucao CVM No. 413, de 13 de Dezembro de 2004, 2004,
D.O.U. de 31.12.2004. (Braz.); (iii) Instrucao CVM No. 450, de 30 de marco de 2007, D.O.U. de 03.04.2007.
(Braz.); and (iv) Instrucao CVM No. 456, de 18 de agosto de 2004, D.O.U. de 26.06.2007). (Braz.). The
updated and consolidated text of these regulations are available at http://www.cvm.org.br.
6. See Instrucao CVM No. 409 of de 18 de agosto de 2004, art. 2, item VIII.
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country of issuance and must be supervised by recognized local authorities.7 These re-
quirements also apply to specific accounts opened in an investment fund's name.8
With respect to carbon credit certificates or derivatives issued in Brazil, an investment
fund may invest only in financial assets that are (1) approved for trading on a major stock,
futures, or commodities exchange in Brazil,9 or (2) recorded in Brazil's relevant registra-
tion system and duly authorized by Bacen or the CVM.1o These requirements also apply
to specific accounts opened in an investment fund's name."
The CVM has concluded that currently there is no need to impose specific regulations
with respect to activities related to the issuance of carbon credits. If and when the need
arises, the CVM will consider such specific rules governing fund-raising structures and
financial products derived from carbon credits.
H. Tied Agents and the EU Passporting Regime*
Under Directive MIFID 1,12 an investment firm may carry on its business in another
Member State on the basis (and within the scope) of its authorization in its home Member
State. The business may be carried on either on a cross-border basis under article thirty-
one of the MIFID or as a branch under article thirty-two of MIFID. Any generally per-
manent physical presence by an investment firm in the host Member State requires open-
ing a branch, while remote activity (e.g. remote trading on a stock exchange) may be done
on a cross border basis.
Both methods of providing investment services require the investment firm to follow
the "passporting" procedure that starts with a notification to the home Member State
regulator (or competent authority in the MIFID). When cross border services are to be
provided, the regulator has one month to examine the matter, after which its approval is
transmitted to the regulator of the host Member State. In the event of establishing a
branch, the approval will generally be transmitted within three months. After receiving
such approval, the supervisor in the host Member State has two months to inform the
investment firm of any particular requirements that should be followed when carrying
business in the host Member State.
In addition, the MIFID uses the concept of "tied agents" that an investment firm may
use to promote its services and collect orders. A tied agent (any natural or legal person)
may act on behalf of only one investment firm. In relations with clients and regulators,
7. Instrucao CVM No. 409 of de 18 de agosto de 2004, art. 2, § 5. (Braz.) (paragraph 5 has been added by
Instrucao CVM No. 450 and amended by Instrucao CVM No. 465).
8. Instrucao CVM No. 409 of de 18 de agosto de 2004, art. 2, § 8. (Braz.) (paragraph 8 has also been
added by Instrucao CVM No. 450).
9. In the case of Brazil, the relevant stock, commodity and futures exchange is BM&FBOVESPA
S.A.-Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&F BOVESPA S.A.-Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias
e Futuros), a legal entity created in 2008 by the merger of two major Brazilian exchanges, the Brazilian
Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F) and the Sio Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa).
10. Instrucao No. 409 de 18 de agosto de 2004, art. 2, § 3 (paragraph 3 has been added by Instrucao CVM
No. 450).
11. Instrucao No. 409 de 18 de agosto de 2004, art. 2, § 8 (applies to domestic financial assets).
* Section II "Tied Agents and the EU Passporting Regime" was contributed by Jacek Jonak, Jacek Jonak
Kancelaria Radcy Prawnego in Warsaw, Poland.
12. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004 OJ. (L 145) 1-44.
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the firm shall be fully and unconditionally responsible for its agent. Tied agents must be
registered with the regulator in the country of its residence (a registered seat). From the
first reading of the MIFID, one may conclude that when using tied agents in another host
Member State, an investment firm should be treated as if it acted on a cross-border basis.
Yet this is not the case: regulators adopted an approach under which an agent is treated as
part of the firm at which it works, despite an agency and not an employment relationship.
The Committee of European Securities Regulators stated that if investment services are
provided by a tied agent in a country where the investment firm has no existing branch,
this agent is "treated as a branch presence in that country." 3 Consequently, the passport-
ing procedure that should be applied is a longer, five-month procedure.
The activities of the tied agent are supervised by a competent authority of the home
Member State. Therefore, contractual arrangements between the agent and the invest-
ment firm should ensure that not only the compliance officer of the investment firm, but
also representatives of the home Member State regulatory authority who supervise the
entire investment firm's business have access to all relevant data.
m. The Role of the African Development Bank*
The African Development Bank Group (the AfDB) is a multilateral finance institution
affiliated with the World Bank, which furthers social and economic development in Africa
and is a source for the development of financial products and services in Africa. In this
sense, the AfDB serves a similar role to the Inter-American Development Bank in South
and Central America and the Asian Development Bank in Asia.
A. LoANs
The AfDB's financial products generally consist of loans, which include synthetic local
currency, as well as syndicated loans.14 Typically, the AfDB's standard loans are either
Sovereign Guaranteed Loans (SGL) or Non-Sovereign Guaranteed Loans (NSGL). A
SGL is a loan made to an African regional member country (RMC) or a public sector
enterprise, supported by the full faith and credit of the RMC in which the borrower is
domiciled. Multinational institutions are eligible borrowers under a SGL if they are guar-
anteed by a RMC (usually the RMC in which the relevant development project is located).
A NSGL is a loan made to a public or private sector enterprise without the requirement of
a sovereign guarantee.
B. Eourry INVESTMENTS
The AfDB equity investments include both direct or indirect investments as well as
quasi-equity such as investments in redeemable preferred shares, subordinated loans, and
13. Eur. Comm'n, Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators, The Passport Under MiFID: Recommendations for the
Implementation of the Directive 2004/39/EC and Statement on Practical Arrangements Regarding the Late
Transposition of MiFID, item 31, CESR/07-337b (Oct. 2007).
13. Section III "The Role of the African Development Bank" was contributed by Francisca Brodrick, an
ABA member admitted to the bar of Nigeria.
14. See FINANcIAL PRODUCTS OF THE AFRicAN DEVELOPMENT BArNiK: MAxiMISING AFRicA's ACCESS
To CAPIfAL 5-12, (2009), available at http-J/www.afdb op.cit.
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convertible subordinated loans."s The AfDB seeks to be an active owner through con-
structive board membership in the companies in which it invests funds. It provides valua-
ble management advice and insight. As a matter of policy, it will not seek to own more
than twenty-five of the outstanding shares of a company. The AfDB divests itself of its
holding through sales on a local stock exchange or to local private investors.
C. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The AfDB provides technical assistance services through grants to borrowers in order
to assist them on related ancillary matters. The AfDB provides these types of grants to
RMCs and to the private sector in RMCs.16
D. RISK MANAGEMENT AND COUNTER-CYCLICAL PRODUCTS
The AfDB provides risk management products such as interest rate swaps and caps/
collars, currency swaps, and commodity swaps.17 As a result of the recent financial crisis,
the AfDB added counter-cyclical products designed to meet the needs of its member
countries. These products include an emergency liquidity facility as well as a trade finance
initiative.' 8
IV. Developments in the Netherlands*
A. BANKING CODE
The Netherlands Bankers' Association (NVB) published its Banking Code' 9 on Sep-
tember 7, 2009 in response to, and partially based on, the Dutch Advisory Committee's
report of April 7, 2009 on the Future of Banks. 20 The Banking Code will enter into force
as of January 1, 2010 and shall be applied on a "comply or explain" basis.
The Code applies to all activities in the Netherlands performed by banks granted a
banking license pursuant to the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel
toezicht or Wft), irrespective of whether they perform their activities in the Netherlands
or in another EU member state, and irrespective of whether a branch performs those
activities. Banks that are part of a group can apply parts of the Code at a group level or on
a consolidated basis. In principle, the Code applies in full to all relevant entities of a
banking group. In addition, it is recommended that the Code apply to all entities of
Dutch incorporated banking groups operating outside of the EU and to those entities
operating in the Netherlands, irrespective of their country of incorporation. It is also
15. Id. at 19.
16. Id. at 27-28.
17. Id. at 20-24.
18. Id. at 25-26.
* Section IV "Developments in the Netherlands" was contributed by Lennaert Posch and Maarten
Landkroon, attorneys with Stibbe, New York.
19. Code Banken (Banking Code) Stert. No. 20060, Dec. 23, 2009. The English informal translation of
the Banking Code is available at http://www.nvb.nl/scrivo/asset.php?id=291515.
20. This committee was established as a result of the 2008 financial crises. ADVISORY COMNUTTE TO THE
FirruRE OF BANKs IN THE NETHEERLANDS, RESTORING TRUST (2009), available at http//www.nvb.nl/
scrivo/asset.php?id=290353.
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expressly recommended that activities and branches of banks licensed in another EU
member state apply the Code.
In general, the Code contains principles and recommendations related to the composi-
tion, expertise, knowledge, availability, and activities of both the supervisory board and
executive board of a bank. The Code includes the following recommendations:
* The supervisory board should pay special attention to the bank's risk management.
All discussions related to risk management should be prepared by a risk committee or
a similar committee that has sound knowledge of the tasks assigned to it and has been
appointed by the supervisory board from its ranks for this purpose.21
* All members of the executive board should have thorough knowledge of the financial
sector in general and the banking sector in particular and should be aware of the
bank's activities that affect society and the interests of all stakeholders. In that re-
spect, each member of the executive board should be required to sign a moral and
ethical conduct declaration. 22
* The executive board-and primarily its chairman-should be responsible for adopting,
implementing, monitoring, and where necessary, adjusting the bank's overall risk pol-
icy. The executive board should set out the bank's risk appetite23 to the supervisory
board for approval at least once a year. Any material changes to such risk appetite in
the interim should also require the supervisory board's approval. 24
* One or more executive board member should be responsible for the bank's risk man-
agement decisions. More than one executive board member may be responsible for
this task if the relevant decision materially affects the bank's risk profile and may
result in a departure from the bank's risk appetite, as approved by the supervisory
board. This executive board member may not hold direct responsibility for any af-
fected commercial areas and should operate independently from the areas for which
he or she has primary risk management responsibility. 25
* Every bank should haye a product approval process in place, which should prevent
products being launched or distributed in the marketplace without careful considera-
tion of relevant risks and other factors, such as duties of care towards the bank's
clients. Furthermore, risk management should include a focus on financial stability
and the impact of systemic risk on the bank's risk profile. 26
* The bank should have its own internal, independent auditor periodically exchanging
information with the bank's external accountants as well as the risk and/or audit com-
mittees of the bank. 27
* Variable compensation should be more restrictive and should be, inter alia, at least
partially based on long-term goals and should take into account known risks and
capital costs. In any case the supervisory board's compensation should not depend on
a bank's financial results.28
21. Code Banken, 1 2.2.1.
22. Id. 19 3.1.2, 3.2.3.
23. Risk appetite (in Dutch, risicobereidbeid) refers to the amount of reasonably foreseeable risk that the
bank-given its proposed activities-is prepared to accept in the pursuit of its objectives.
24. Code Banken, 1 4.1.
25. Id. 1 3.1.8.
26. Id. 1 4.5.
27. Id. 1 5.
28. Id. 1 2.1.7.
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B. INTRODUCTION OF A MITIGATED, VOLUNTARY SUPERVISION REGIME
In September 2009, the Dutch cabinet proposed to amend the Wft, pursuant to which
certain investment institutions offering their participation rights only to qualified inves-
tors and to the investment institution's managers, who may opt for voluntary supervision
by applying for a declaration to that effect. At present, under the Wft these investment
institutions-as opposed to those institutions that offer participation rights to the general
public-do not require a license and are exempt from rules on market access, prudential
rules, and rules of conduct. But pursuant to their own domestic rules and regulations,
certain foreign institutional investors-mainly insurance companies and pension institu-
tions-are allowed to invest only in participation rights offered by regulated and supervised
investment institutions. To enable those foreign parties to invest in the Netherlands, the
Dutch cabinet made the aforementioned proposal, which is intended to enter into force as
of January 1, 2010.29
The proposed regime is more limited in scope than the Wft, because all provisions of
the Wft relating to the mandatory supervision regime will not apply to institutions apply-
ing the voluntary supervision regime. Several rules and requirements relating to expertise
and reliability of the institution's management and policies, minimum equity, liquidity and
notification duties, information duties, custody, and registration with the Dutch Financial
Markets Authority (AFM) do apply. Rules relating to quality of information, quantity and
place of management, supply, and publication of annual accounts and mandatory annual
revaluation of certain assets do not apply.
The introduction of this flexible regime is intended to attract those institutional and
sophisticated investors that may currently participate in funds that operate under similar
regimes in other countries, such as the Luxembourg Specialized Investment Fund.
V. Developments in Switzerland*
A. INTRODUCTION
Last year's regulatory developments in Switzerland have been driven by efforts to re-
spond to the worldwide financial crisis and its effects on the Swiss financial industry gen-
erally and on Switzerland's leading internationally active banks in particular.
B. Swiss BANK CUSTOMER SECRECY
Switzerland has been involved in on-going discussions related to global tax havens, as
exemplified by the widely publicized dispute between UBS AG and the U.S. Internal Rev-
enue Service (the IRS).30 The matter with respect to UBS AG finally has been settled and
involved a dispute with respect to information requested by the IRS related to accounts
held by thousands of American citizens alleged to have engaged in tax evasion and even tax
29. Hand. Kamerstukken (2009/2010, 32 036, no. 3.) (Neth.).
* Section V "Developments in Switzerland" was contributed by Dr. Martin Liebi, attorney at Bir &
Karrer AG in Zurich, Switzerland.
30. Joseph Heaven & Klaus Wille, Swiss to Work with U.S. to Save UBS Tax Agreement, MIAnn HERALD, Jan.
28, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/01/28/1449795/swiss-to-work-with-us-to-save.html.
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fraud with the assistance of UBS AG.3 ' Many international observers have characterized
the settlement as the end of the Swiss bank customer secrecy. Although Switzerland had
already agreed to comply fully with the information sharing mechanism provided for in
the Organizasion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Tax
Convention, rules pertaining to Swiss bank customer secrecy have not been abolished.
Switzerland will not grant automatic information exchange pursuant to re-negotiated
double taxation treaties, but will share information and mutual assistance in specific, rea-
sonably established cases of alleged tax evasion or tax fraud. 32
C. COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES
As a result of the financial crisis, the Swiss Financial Market Authority (FINMA) has
allowed for the creation of "side pockets" consisting of illiquid hedge fund investments
made by Swiss Funds of Hedge Funds. FINMA's ruling on whether to allow side pockets
is important for the industry because Switzerland is one of the main markets for domestic
and foreign Fund of Hedge Funds products. The creation of side pockets requires an
approval of FINMA. Approval will be granted if the creation is in the interest of investors
and no investor rights are supposedly violated. For Funds of Hedge Funds, the downside
of creating side pockets is that such action results in a prohibition against issuing new
units.3 3 This constraint also applies to foreign Funds of Hedge Funds licensed for public
distribution in Switzerland.
The Swiss Government decided to amend the Ordinance on Collective Investment
Schemes by abolishing the so-called "Swiss finish" and to make the Ordinance on Collec-
tive Investment Schemes compliant with corresponding European rules. Certain proce-
dural requirements were abolished and the Swiss rules were made consistent with the
minimum EU standard. The management of Collective Investment Schemes will ensure
that relevant investments are in line with the implied investment purpose of the particular
fund. FINMA also relaxed limitations related to charges of investment fees for invest-
ments in related target funds. 34
D. Awrn-MoNEY LAUNDERING RULES
Anti-money laundering regulation has been tightened in Switzerland by introducing
new identification obligations regarding legal persons as parties to a contract. An obliga-
tion to identify the purpose and nature of the related business relationship was also
introduced. 3s
3 1. Id.
32. News Circular, Swiss Tax Administration, Consent to Sharing of Information (Sept. 25, 2009), available
at http://www.estv.admin.ch/00977/index.html?lang=en. Double taxation treaties related to enhanced mutual
assistance in tax matters have been renegotiated with the USA, Qatar, Finland, Denmark, Mexico, Great
Britain, Austria, Norway, Singapore, France, and Luxembourg.
33. FINMA, Side Pockets for Funds of Hedge Funds (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.finma.chle/aktuell/Pages/
aktuell-sidepockets-20090123.aspx.
34. FINMA, Suppression of "Swiss Finish" for Collective Investment Schemes (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.
finma.ch/elaktuelVPages/aktuell-abschaffung-swissfinish-20090220.aspx.
35. FINMA, New Due Diligence Under the Money Laundering Act, Which Entered into Force on I
February 2009 (Apr. 3, 2009), http-J/www.finma.ch/e/akruell/Pages/aktuell-sorgfaltspflicht-20090403.aspx.
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E. SUPERVISORY AcTlvrrES OF THE Swiss FINANcLA MARKETs AUrHORITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE FINANCL CiUsis
FINMA issued a report (in German) about the roots of the financial crisis and its super-
visory response. 36 In this report, FINMA outlined the problems with which it was con-
fronted and the actions it took in response. FINMA came to the conclusion that the
financial crisis was in first instance a global problem due to a misinterpretation of the
stability of the financial system by market participants and regulators. FINMA stated that
its response was generally no better or worse than the response of regulatory authorities in
other jurisdictions. The regulator criticized some of its policy responses to the financial
crisis, in particular, its supervisory activities in respect of UBS AG, one of two major Swiss
global banks. FINMA admitted that its staff supervising UBS AG and Credit Suisse
Group did not possess sufficient skills and expertise to adequately perform their supervi-
sory functions.37
One of FINMA's key findings was that the two Swiss globally active banks were well
capitalized according to minimum international standards.38 This was also true when cap-
italization was measured in accordance with the Value-at-Risk model, which has begun to
be utilized in accordance with the Basel I and the Basel II accords.39 The application of
this model resulted in a significant underestimate of real risk exposure, because the model
did not take into consideration outliers of the magnitude experienced during the financial
crisis. FINMA therefore came to the conclusion that (i) the capital requirements applica-
ble to major globally active banks must be increased; (ii) risk calculation models must be
improved; (iii) a leverage ratio independent of a risk capital quota should be introduced;
(iv) a countercyclical equity cushion should be introduced; and (v) the equity component
of a bank's balance sheet should be made more stable.40
FINMA also found that the regulation of liquidity management by banks had been
neglected. The financial crisis has shown that adequate liquidity management is as impor-
tant as adequate capitalization. FINMA also admitted that it did not track and criticize
the growth of the total balance sheet of UJBS AG.41 An enhanced focus on the growth rate
of the UBS AG total balance sheet, instead of a focus on risk-adjusted assets, would have
uncovered additional risks that went unheeded.
FINMA concluded the report with the finding that it seriously had underestimated both
certain inherent systemic risks as well as certain company-related problems, the result of
which was an inadequate regulatory response. FINMA found, however, that by the same
token the de-regulatory environment that was generally pervasive would not have allowed
for stricter regulatory supervision. 42 Stricter regulatory supervision would probably have
been seen as overly bureaucratic and anti-commercial and would likely have lacked neces-
sary political support to implement.
36. FINMA, FINANcIAL MARKET Cisis AND FINANcIAL MARKET SUPERVISION (2009).
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 18. The BIS Tier 1-capital quota as of June 30, 2007 was 12.3% for UBS AG and 13.0% for
Credit Suisse Group.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 32-33.
41. Id. at 37.
42. Id. at 18.
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